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Introduction
Awareness of the many ecological services provided by tropical forests (Costanza et al. 1997) and the rapid increase in tropical deforestation has put forests 
at the center stage of the policy debate between developers, 
conservationists, and policymakers. Researchers have studied 
many of the factors influencing deforestation, such as the 
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opening of new roads (Chomitz and Gray 1996; Reid 2001), 
property rights (Alston, Libecap, and Mueller 2000; Deacon 
1999; Godoy, Kirby, and Wilkie 2001), the spread of cash crop-
ping (McMorrow and Talip 2001), slash-and-burn agriculture, 
cattle ranching, and logging (Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Palm 
et al. 2005). Research suggests that the drivers of deforestation 
interact in complex ways (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999). 
Because of the complexity of the issue, site-specific 
variability, and the lack of reliable empirical information 
about the causes of deforestation, there is little consensus as 
to which mechanisms best explain deforestation (Kaimowitz 
and Angelsen 1998). A lack of empirical information hinders 
our understanding of deforestation. Kaimowitz and Angelsen 
(1998) reviewed 146 econometric models of deforestation and 
found that 24 percent relied on simulations and 23 percent 
drew on theoretical models that included no empirical data. 
Furthermore, among the 53 percent of the studies based 
on empirical data, 38 drew on secondary, national-level 
data. Only nine of the models reviewed (6% of total) used 
household-level empirical data. The authors suggest that 
future studies of the causes of deforestation should focus on 
household and regional-level data, with a strong micro-level 
empirical base (Kaimowitz and Angelsen 1998:99). Since 
the publication of the review by Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 
another excellent household-level study of deforestation has 
appeared (Rudel 2005). 
This study has two aims. In the first part, we draw on 
household-level data from the Tsimane’, a horticultural and 
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foraging society of native Amazonians in Bolivia, to assess 
how cash cropping by smallholders affects neotropical de-
forestation. We focus on clearing of fallow and old-growth 
forest because previous research suggests that both forest 
types harbor substantial biological diversity (Finegan 1996; 
Silver, Brown, and Lugo 1996; Smith et al. 1999). In the 
second part of the paper, we use data in a needs-based simu-
lation to explore the consequences of the rural poor using 
cash crops to escape poverty. We focus on the consequences 
of household-level decisions to deforest for the total area of 
forest cleared, for household labor requirements, and for the 
duration of the fallow. We pay special attention to fallow 
duration because previous research suggests that increased 
land scarcity reduces the length of fallow (Coomes, Grimard, 
and Burt 2000).
This work contributes to the debate on the causes of de-
forestation in several ways. First, we use household-level data, 
which is relatively rare in studies of deforestation (Kaimowitz 
and Angelsen 1998). Second, we document deforestation by 
indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples do not account for 
a large share of deforestation, but this share could grow as 
indigenous people become more integrated into the market 
economy (Godoy 2001) and their population swells (Picchi 
1991). Third, we contribute to the debate on the effects of 
technological innovations in agriculture to deforestation. 
The results of the simulations could help formulate recom-
mendations as to the type of technologies needed to reconcile 
development and conservation of tropical forests. 
Cash Cropping, Farm Technologies, and 
Deforestation
While many studies address causes of deforestation, few 
use primary data to focus on the effects of cash cropping. The 
empirical literature available often focuses on the impact 
of cash cropping on deforestation through the introduction 
of new farm technologies (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2001; 
McMorrow and Talip 2001; Pendleton and Howe 2004). 
Some of the evidence suggests that cash cropping in-
creases deforestation. For example, Dearden (1995) found 
that in Thailand, intensification of cash cropping of cab-
bage increased deforestation because cabbage had a low 
value compared with opium, which it was replacing. In a 
household-level study in Cameroon, Mertens and colleagues 
(2000) found that deforestation increased as the marketing 
of food crops increased. Other researchers suggest that cash 
cropping does not necessarily contribute to deforestation. For 
example, Tungittiplakorn and Dearden (2002) also found that 
cash cropping cabbage and carnations in Thailand reduced 
pressure on forests because the new cash crops required less 
land than traditional crops, and therefore allowed more people 
per unit of land. Similarly, Perz (2004) found that raising rural 
income through agricultural diversity in forest frontiers did 
not necessarily reduce forest cover. 
Part of the debate on the effects of cash cropping on tropi-
cal forests clearing relates to the use of new farm technologies. 
A common assumption is that technological improvements in 
agriculture would decrease deforestation because an increase 
in production per unit area would reduce the farmers’ need 
to keep clearing new lands (Holden 1993; Jones et al. 1995; 
Palm et al. 2005). However, some empirical studies suggest 
that new agricultural technologies contribute to environmen-
tal degradation and deforestation (Godoy 2001; Humphries 
1993; Marquette 1998). For example, Humphries (1993) 
found that agricultural intensification among Yucatec Maya 
smallholders increased sedentary production, and heightened 
reliance on chemicals, with negative consequences for the 
environment. In the Ecuadorian Amazon, Marquette (1998) 
found that improvements in human welfare of settlers in the 
agricultural frontier were related to economic activities that 
increased the area of land cleared. 
A third group of authors suggests that technological 
improvements might produce ambiguous results, depending 
on the type of agricultural technology used (Angelsen and 
Kaimowitz 2001). For example, Pichón and colleagues (2002) 
found that in the Ecuadorian Amazon, farmers in agricultural 
frontiers adopted a low-intensity strategy for coffee produc-
tion, which generated less forest clearing. However, farm-
ers who could afford it specialized in raising cattle, which 
increased both income and forest clearing. 
In sum, prior studies on the impact of cash cropping 
and new farm technologies on deforestation have produced 
ambiguous results.
Materials and Method
Tsimane’ Agriculture 
The Tsimane’ live in the lowlands of Bolivia, mostly 
along the Maniqui and Apere rivers in the department of Beni. 
Detailed ethnographies of the Tsimane’ can be found in recent 
dissertations and books (Byron 2003; Chicchon 1992; Dail-
lant 2003; Ellis 1996; Huanca 2007; Reyes-García 2001). 
Tsimane’ are hunters who also practice slash-and-burn 
agriculture to cultivate upland rice, maize, manioc, and 
plantains as main staples. They also plant a variety of less 
important crops, such as sugar cane, peanuts, sweet potatoes, 
ahipa, and citrus (Huanca 1999; Piland 1991; Vadez et al. 
2003). Although Tsimane’ have remained foragers and depend 
on forest resources, they are becoming increasingly dependent 
on farming. Farm products account for more than half of the 
cash income of the Tsimane’ (Reyes-García 2001). 
The Tsimane’ gather and farm their own land. Tsimane’ 
land legally belongs to the entire ethnic group. In a typical 
village, houses are scattered around the school, and house-
holds usually farm around the village in a radius of about 2 
kilometers. The mean nucleated area of a village measures 
about 1,250 hectares. Land availability per household depends 
on the number of households in the village. We found that 
villages had between 10 and 70 households, suggesting that 
each household has access to between 18 and 125 hectares 
of land.
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Tsimane’ farming is extensive, and oriented to household 
consumption and sale. People usually abandon the plots after 
one or two cultivation cycles and clear another plot. In a recent 
study, we found that the market economy is influencing the tra-
ditional farming practices of Tsimane’, but not in the expected 
direction. Unlike previous studies with native Amazonians 
(Godoy 2001), we found that Tsimane’ integration in the market 
economy did not decrease the diversity of crops grown (Vadez et 
al. 2004). Households more integrated into the market economy 
cultivated more rice, a finding consistent with the increasing 
demand for rice in the region and with the increasing importance 
of rice in the household economy of the Tsimane’. 
Tsimane’ believe that all plants and animals were humans 
in mythical times, and that the gods converted some of the 
humans into today’s animals and plants. Because Tsimane’ 
believe that humans, animals, and plants share a common an-
cestry, they consider them their kin and have a reverential at-
titude toward the forest plants and animals (Huanca 2007). 
The Importance of Rice
In Bolivia, the domestic demand for rice exceeds domestic 
supply (Comisión Europea 2000). The same situation occurs 
in the local market, where the rice supplied by local producers 
does not match demand. Part of the rice consumed comes from 
other regions of Bolivia, such as the department of Santa Cruz, 
or from abroad. Since rice demand is higher than supply, there 
are strong incentives to increase local rice production. 
Jesuit missionaries introduced rice into the Tsimane’ 
territory over 300 years ago (Perez-Diez 1983; Vadez et al. 
2004). Because of this recent introduction, rice lacks the wide 
range of traditional beliefs associated with crops indigenous 
to the area, such as manioc (Huanca 2007). In the 1950s, 
missionaries introduced improved rice varieties together with 
manual sowing machines, technologies that are now widely 
used by the Tsimane’. Later, colonist farmers introduced 
herbicides and pesticides for use in rice farming, but even 
today few Tsimane’ use those chemicals.
Tsimane’ usually open farm plots between July and 
November, sow rice between August and December, and 
harvest rice during the rainy season, between January and 
April. Rice is both a staple and a cash crop and is cultivated 
on 60-80 percent of the surface of newly-opened fields (Va-
dez et al. 2004); the exact share depends on the degree of a 
household’s integration to the market economy. Tsimane’ 
sell rice and other farm products in the town of San Borja 
(population approximately 19,000), but they also sell the 
products to itinerant traders who ply the main rivers and 
roads of the area.
Insufficient rice supplies in the town of San Borja drive 
up the price of rice in the local market town (Figure 1). For 
example, the price in the local market was $0.28/kg shortly 
after harvest in March 2002, and twice as high ($0.48/kg) 
before the following harvest in January 2003. However, Tsi-
mane’ farmers do not take advantage of price fluctuations and 
sell most of their production shortly after the harvest, when 
prices reach their lowest levels. 
Sampling and Data Collection
We collected information from the same households in 
2000, 2001, and 2002. The total sample size reached 715 
households in 18 Tsimane’ villages; we interviewed 174 
households in all three years, and 493 in at least two con-
secutive years. The surveys used a random sub-sample of 
8-12 households per village. In this paper, we use data only 
from households for which we had repeated observations 
for at least two consecutive years. Our sampling strategy 
allowed us to reduce biases from possible reverse causal-
ity, at least in part, by regressing deforestation at time n+1 
against explanatory variables during time n. Although we 
do not exclude the possible role of third variables having 
potentially an effect on both rice area cropped last year and 
today’s deforestation, the procedure represents an improve-
ment over earlier studies of deforestation that typically rely 
on contemporaneous cross-sectional information of outcome 
and explanatory variables.
To estimate the area of forest cleared, we asked the male 
household head to report the area of all plots from old-growth 
and fallow forests owned by the household during the last 
farming cycle and the type of forest cleared. Self-reported 
estimates matched closely the area cleared (Vadez et al. 2003). 
We proxied rice cultivation by asking the male household 
head about the area sown with rice. All measures of area under 
rice cultivation in the surveys reflected the rice area sown in 
the previous cropping season. We did not use cash earnings 
from the sale of rice as a proxy for rice cultivation because the 
volume of rice sale fluctuates over the year and the surveys 
Figure 1.  Retail Rice Prices in San Borja, Bolivia, in 
2002-2003
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took place during three different times: (a) June-September, 
2000, (b) March-May, 2001, and (c) March-May, 2002. 
To estimate household cash income, we asked the male 
household head to report all the sources of income from sale 
and wage labor earned by all the adults in the household 
during the two weeks before the day of the interview. We 
collected data on the sale of farm and forest products disag-
gregated by product. We estimated household consumption 
of farm goods by asking the female household head to report 
the total amount of rice, manioc, and maize consumed in the 
household during the week before the day of the interview. 
We interviewed the main village authority to gather infor-
mation on road access and walking time from the village 
to the nearest market town. Table 1 contains definition and 
summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions. 
Later we discuss how we dealt with possible biases from 
omitted variables. 
How accurate and reliable are income figures obtained 
by restricting the recall period to a two-week period before 
the day of the interview, which took place during the dry 
season? Elsewhere (Godoy et al. n.d.2), we used data from 
a panel data set of five consecutive quarters (1999-2000) to 
estimate quarterly income, and found that daily quarterly 
monetary income during the period reached about $0.90/
person/day. This daily income is within a similar range as 
the estimates presented here based on two-week income 
values. Here we found a daily income of $0.67/person/day 
(calculated as Household earnings from Table 2, averaged 
over three years, and divided by a household size of 4.2 adult 
equivalents). In our previous research, we have also found 
evidence of forward telescoping bias when reporting income 
figures, suggesting that the income figures for the last two 
weeks likely pick up income earned before the two-week 
period (Godoy et al. n.d.1). 
Focus Groups
We used focus groups in 2001 and 2002 to gather infor-
mation about the different labor and technology inputs used 
to cultivate rice. To capture variation in rice management, 
natural resource endowments, and farming skills, we carried 
out focus groups in half of the villages (n=18) taking part 
in the study. Villages varied in distance from the town of 
San Borja. We held focus groups with women and men 
together in the school building. We asked villagers to tell 
us about the number of work days needed to carry out 
different tasks of rice farming. We wrote answers once 
villagers reached a consensus. When groups disagreed, we 
took the mean of the responses. We also asked people to 
estimate yields of a standard variety of rice. For techni-
cal inputs, we asked about the time needed to fell trees 
with a chainsaw, to spread pesticide, and to sow rice with 
a manual sowing machine in a rice field of one hectare. We 
also asked about the cost of chemical inputs in stores in the 
town of San Borja.
The Model
In the first part of the next section, we estimate how cash 
cropping rice by Tsimane’ affects deforestation after control-
ling for competing drivers of deforestation related to market 
integration (e.g., road access, distance to closest market town, 
cash income, and market dependence). By market dependence, 
we mean the share of household consumption from one’s own 
farm plots in total household income. More formally:
Market dependence = Cash income / (cash income + 
consumption value of rice, maize and manioc)
We estimate the following model: 
[1] Yhvn+1 = a + bXhvn + dThvn + fC1v + gC2n + hhvn 
Table 1.  Description and Summary Statistics of the Variables Measured in Surveys (2000-2002)
Variable	 	 Definition	 	 	 Mean	 Sd	 Obs.
Dependent
Total clearing Total area cleared per household equivalenta, in hectares   0.266 0.273 493
Old-growth 
forest clearing Area of old-growth forest cleared per household equivalenta, in hectares  0.120 0.204 463
Explanatory    
Rice area Total area planted with rice per household equivalenta, in hectares   0.222 0.201 469
Walking time Time to the nearest market town, in hours   9.85 10.22 470
Road access Accessibility year round to the village with motor vehicle (0=no access; 1=access) 0.39 0.49 470
Cash income Total household income in past two weeks from sales and wage labor, in US$.  32.01 61.06 472
Market 
dependence Ratio of cash income/(cash income + consumption value of rice + maize + manioc) 0.313 0.304 466
a Area per household equivalent was calculated based on 4.2 adult equivalent per household (sd=1.82, n=493)
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 Where Y is the area deforested by household h in village v, 
in year n+1. X is the area sown with the rice of household h in 
village v the previous year, n. T is a vector of variables that reflects 
the strength of market participation of household h in village v of 
year n. C1 is a set of dummy variables used to control for village 
fixed effects, and C2 is a set of dummy variables for survey years 
to control for the confounding effect of survey year. To control 
for the effect of household size, we used the household values of 
area sown with rice and area cleared, each divided by the number 
of adult equivalents per household. The error term, h, captures 
the part of the variation left unexplained by the model.
To deal with possible biases from omitted variables, we in-
cluded village dummies in the regression model. The procedure 
should allow us to control for the confounding role of village-
level attributes, such as access to markets, or village endow-
ments (e.g., soil fertility). We did not have enough degrees of 
freedom to run a household fixed-effect model, so the estimated 
parameters may be biased by unobserved household attributes 
that affect both rice cultivation and deforestation. For example, 
some households might have access to farm technologies, 
credit, and labor help that would affect both how much rice they 
cultivate and how much forest they clear. We run regressions 
with clustering of households by villages because households 
are nested in villages, and because households from a village 
likely show more similar deforestation patterns than households 
from different villages. Clustering is necessary because the 
units of observation, the households, are not independent of 
one another but clustered in natural units (villages). Clustering 
inflates standard errors, making them more conservative, but 
does not affect the coefficients we estimate. 
The Simulation Model
In the second part of the results section, we explore 
the consequences of Tsimane’ efforts to escape poverty by 
increasing rice production. First, we estimate the amount of 
forest a household would need to clear for income from rice 
to reach $1/person/day (poverty line). Second, we assess 
whether households would be able to meet the additional labor 
requirements of increased cash cropping and the possible role 
of farm technologies in easing household labor constraints. 
Third, we explore the consequences of increased rice produc-
tion on fallow duration. We simulate five scenarios: 
1.  Subsistence scenario is a baseline scenario used for com-
parison. Households keep up with current area clearing 
to meet their needs. We adjust for a demographic increase 
of 4.76 percent per year, in line with current evidence 
about the demographic growth of the Tsimane’ population 
(Reyes-García 2001).
2. Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario: Households 
choose to reach the poverty line using traditional farming 
practices to cultivate rice. 
3. Poverty Line + Farm Technology scenario: Households 
choose to reach the poverty line with new farm technolo-
gies (i.e., herbicides and chainsaws). 
4. Poverty Line + Rice Price Increase scenario: same as (1) 
but rice price increases by three percent per year. 
5. Poverty Line + Encroachment scenario: Same as (1) 
but encroachment represents an increase in the number 
of households per village of three percent per year. We 
assume that encroachers follow the same deforestation 
pattern as do the Tsimane’ households that choose to reach 
the poverty line. 
Appendices A-B contain the assumptions, formulas, and 
empirical data used to simulate the five scenarios. Although 
most of the parameters used reflect empirical observations, 
some assumptions may not fully mimic the future. For in-
stance, households split over time, some may migrate out 
of the area, or some may diversify their income resources 
by pursuing non-farm occupations. Schooling may lower 
the rate of demographic increase. However, we kept the as-
sumptions simple to make the simulation easy and open to 
further exploration. Our estimates are conservative because 
we simulated the changes that would need to occur in order 
for households to reach the poverty threshold of $1/person/
Table 2. Rice in the Tsimane’ Economy (2000-2002). Data Are Mean ± Standard Deviation. 
  2000 2001  2002
Rice incomea   13.2±32.9 9.9±21.5  6.8±14.1
Household earningsb   44.5±57.1 43.9±74.3  29.7±35.6
Rice % of total earnings 25.9±33.5 21.3±26.3  22.6±25.1
Percentile
25    0 0  0
50    0 7  15
75    51 41  40
90    82 58  53
Nº Observations   511 378  331
Time survey  July-September  March-April  February-April
a Sum of rice transactions in cash and in kind, in US$ for past two weeks.
b Sum of sales in kind and cash, and wage labor, in US$ for past two weeks.
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day. However, people would probably aspire to incomes 
beyond this minimum value.
Results
Rice Micro-economy
During 2000, 2001, and 2002 households earned $13.2, 
$9.9, and $6.8 from rice in the two weeks prior to the in-
terview, equivalent to about 26 percent, 21 percent, and 23 
percent of their total cash income for the same period (Table 
2). We found large variation between households in their 
participation in the rice market. For 50 percent of households, 
rice represented 0 percent, 7 percent and 14.7 percent of their 
income in 2000, 2001, and 2002. At the other extreme, for 
10 percent of the households, rice represented 82 percent, 58 
percent, and 53 percent of their total income in 2000, 2001, 
and 2002. Variation in rice trade, as well as the fact that 
households that cultivate large areas of rice also sell a lot of 
rice (Vadez et al. 2004), give us an ideal setting to estimate 
the relationship between rice cultivation and deforestation.
We first used data from focus groups to asses the vari-
ous costs (in labor and money) incurred under the traditional 
method of cultivating rice; that is, we asses the value of 
traditional inputs. We found that one hectare of rice required 
about 101.9 person-days of work from field opening to rice 
harvesting (Table 3). Participants estimated an average yield 
of 1,540 kg/ha, which would result in a gross income of $176/
ha (1 kg of rice= $0.114). We divided gross income by labor 
input to calculate the return on labor investment for rice: each 
day allocated to rice production provides an average wage of 
$1.72/day. This is about 66 percent of the local daily average 
wage for unskilled laborers for work in cattle ranches and log-
ging concessions. Daily wages in these occupations vary by 
season but average about $2.60/day. Participants estimated that 
a typical adult could dedicate at most 170 days/year to cultivate 
rice because rice does not grow all year and people have other 
activities. Assuming that a typical household is composed of 
three adults (Reyes-García 2001), every household would have 
about 510 person-days available to cultivate rice every year.
We used information from the same focus groups to 
assess how modern technology would affect work inputs to 
cultivate rice, with particular attention to: (1) the use of chain 
saws to fell trees, (2) the use of manual sowing machines, 
and (3) the use of herbicides to replace manual weeding. 
The chainsaw work was estimated at two days to fell all the 
trees in one hectare and would cost $21.84. The cost of using 
manual sowing machines is $0.05/ha. Spraying herbicides 
would cost $9.87/ha. Total input costs for using the three 
technologies is $31.76/ha, which decreases the income per 
hectare by about 18 percent, from $176/ha with traditional 
practice to $144.24/ha with modern technology. However, the 
use of modern technology increases by 70 percent the returns 
to labor investment, from $1.72/day with traditional practice 
to $2.94/day with modern technology. The higher returns to 
labor investment are due to reduced work input by 52 percent, 
from 101.9 work person-days to 49.1 work person-days with 
modern technology (Table 3). In sum, the use of modern farm 
technologies decreases the work requirement to cultivate rice, 
while increasing the return on labor investment almost to the 
level of local unskilled wage labor. 
Regressions
Rice Cash Cropping 
We used expression [1] to estimate the relation between 
the area of rice sown in a given year and the total area cleared 
the following year. Using untransformed data, we found 
that the area of rice sown in year n bore a highly signifi-
cant positive relation to the total area deforested in year 
n+1. An additional hectare of rice planted was associated 
with 0.30 more hectares deforested in the subsequent year 
(Table 4). Results were similar whether using village or 
Table 3. Summary Statistic for Labor Inputs in 
Rice Cultivation and other Economic 
Parameters. Data Are the Mean (± sd) of 
Data Collected in Focus Groups in 18 
Villages. 
 
Activities Rice, traditional Rice, modern 
 
 
Field preparation 
Slashing (days/ha) 14.1±5.4 14.1±5.4 
Felling (days/ha) 22.9±5.9 0 
Burning-Cleaning (days/ha) 4.3±5.6 4.3±5.6 
Crop management 
Sowing (days/ha) 11.7±5.1 2.3±1.0 
Weeding (days/ha) 23.2±8.0 2
a
 
Harvesting (days/ha) 26.4±4.5 26.4±4.5 
Technology inputs 
Chainsaw
b
 (US$/ha) 0 17.84 
Sowing machine
c
 (US$/ha) 0 0.05 
Herbicide
d
 (US$/ha) 0 9.87 
Economic parameters 
Yield (kg/ha) 1540±241 1540±241 
Total work (days/ha) 101.9 49.1 
Total input (US$/ha) 0 31.76 
Net income (US$/ha) 176 144.24 
Productivity of work (US$/day) 1.72 2.94 
 
a
 Data estimated from information with Tsimane’ key informants 
b
 Two days wage (7.89 US$/ha), 10 liters of gas (3.95 US$/ha), 
cost and maintenance (10 US$/ha) 
c
 Cost 5.26 US$ and would work for about a 100 ha minimum, 
that is 0.05 US$/ha 
d
 Chemical inputs: 6.58 US$/ha, plus 3.29 US$ per ha for rental, 
based on the pump price 
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year dummies. We re-estimated expression [1] taking the 
logarithm of total area deforested and area planted with rice 
to obtain elasticity coefficients (i.e., the percentage change 
in the dependent variable from a one percent change in the 
explanatory variable). We found that the area planted with 
rice bore a significant positive association with the area 
deforested. A two-fold increase in the area cultivated with 
rice correlated with about a 26-27 percent increase in the 
total area deforested by a household during the following 
cropping season (Table 4). Results were similar when using 
village and year dummies. 
To assess whether rice cultivation is also associated with 
greater deforestation of old-growth forest, we re-estimated 
expression [1] using the amount of old-growth forest cleared 
(instead of total area cleared) as a dependent variable. For this 
estimation, we used a Tobit regression because 48 percent of 
households did not clear old-growth forest. The area sown with 
rice in year n was associated with a significant increase in the 
clearing of old-growth forest the following year (Table 5). An 
additional hectare cultivated with rice was associated with an 
increase of 0.17 and 0.18 hectares of old-growth forest cleared. 
The lower estimate corresponds to a regression that controls for 
village fixed effects and survey year, while the higher estimate 
comes from a regression without such controls. 
We took the logarithm of old-growth forest and rice area 
and ran the same regressions to obtain elasticity coefficients. 
The area sown with rice (in logarithms) showed a highly 
significant relationship to deforestation of old-growth forest 
in the next cropping season. Doubling the area of rice was 
associated with a 26 percent increase in old-growth forest 
clearing in the regression using dummy variables to control 
for village fixed effects and survey year. In the regression with 
no such controls, doubling the area sown with rice was associ-
ated with a 28 percent increase in old-growth deforestation 
(Table 5). Since many households did not clear old-growth 
forest, we added +1 to the dependent variable. The regressions 
retained their significance, but elasticity coefficients were 
much lower than in the Tobit regressions; the elasticity was 
0.032 (p<0.002) in the regression using dummy variables to 
control for village fixed effects, and 0.030 (p<0.02) in the 
regression using no such controls. 
In sum, the area cultivated with rice in year n is posi-
tively associated with the amount of area cleared by the 
household in year n+1, even after controlling for village 
fixed effects and survey year. Results suggest that the ob-
served association between cash cropping and deforestation 
does not reflect village attributes or time variant aspects. 
Rather, deforestation probably has more to do with house-
hold characteristics.
Other Variables of Market Integration
We estimated the correlation between deforestation 
and two village-level variables: walking time to the near-
est market town and permanent road access for vehicles. 
Walking time to the nearest market town bore no significant 
statistical associations with deforestation, either when using 
total area cleared (p<0.31) or when using the logarithm of 
old-growth forest cleared (p<0.12; Table 5). Permanent road 
access for vehicles had no significant statistical association 
Table 4. Regression with Total Deforestation, First with Raw Data (Column 1 & 2), and with the Logarithm 
of Deforestation and Rice Rrea (Column 3 & 4). Data Are the Regression Coefficients with 
Standard Errors in Brackets. Significance at the 99, 95 and 90% Level Indicated with ***, **, and *.  
 
Deforestation Raw data Logarithm 
 
 
Rice area 0.300*** 0.306*** - - 
 (0.096) (0.097) 
Log (rice area) - - 0.263*** 0.276*** 
   (0.044) (0.040) 
Walking time NA -0.0017 NA -0.0056 
  (0.0013)  (0.0045) 
Road access NA 0.0023 NA 0.0272 
  (0.0299)  (0.0824) 
Cash income 0.211 0.345 0.812 1.166** 
 (0.186) (0.157) (0.443) (0.389) 
Market dependence 0.054 0.041 0.087 0.104 
 (0.078) (0.057) (0.168) (0.132) 
Observations 463 463 449 449 
R
2
 0.14 0.07 0.21 0.12 
Village dummy variables Yes No Yes No 
 
NA, non applicable. Variables taken out of regressions using village dummies.  
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with total or with old-growth deforestation in any of the 
regressions. 
We also looked at two other household-level proxies 
for integration to the market: household cash income and 
household market dependence. In the regression with raw data 
for total deforestation as a dependent variable, there was no 
significant statistical association between cash income in year 
n and total forest area cleared in year n+1 (columns 1 and 
2, Table 4). In the regression using logarithmic data and no 
dummy variables to control for village fixed effects and year 
effects, there was a significant statistical association between 
cash income and total deforestation (column 4, Table 4). In the 
Tobit regression with the clearing of old-growth forest without 
controls for village fixed effects and year effects (column 2, 
Table 5), we found a statistically significant relation between 
cash income and old-growth forest clearing. In the regressions 
using logarithmic data of old-growth forest, we did not find a 
significant association between cash income and old-growth 
forest clearing (columns 3 and 4, Table 5). 
Households’ market dependence in year n bore no significant 
association with total deforestation in year n+1 (Table 4). The 
explanatory variable had only a weak statistical association with 
the level of deforestation of old-growth forest in the regression 
using the logarithm of old-growth forest and without dummy 
variables for year and village fixed effects (p<0.05). Doubling 
the degree of market dependence was associated with 56 percent 
more deforestation of old-growth forest (column 4, Table 5).
In sum, among the various explanatory variables for 
deforestation, cultivation of rice in year n bore the largest 
association with area cleared in the year n+1. The finding 
supports the intuition that there may be strong incentives for 
rice production in the study area. 
Can Poor Rural Households Cash Crop 
Themselves Out of Poverty?
We have seen that Tsimane’ households obtained on aver-
age about 21-26 percent of their cash earnings through the sale 
of rice and that 25 percent of all the households obtained up 
to 40-50 percent of their cash income through rice. Since rice 
is in high demand in the local market, but local supply does 
not meet local demand, and since Tsimane’ income per capita 
is only about $0.90/person/day (Godoy et al. 2002), below 
the $1/person/day poverty line defined by the World Bank, it 
is reasonable to assume that Tsimane’ would rely on the sale 
of rice to increase income. Based on those assumptions, we 
simulate what would happen to land and labor requirements 
and to fallow duration if Tsimane’ decide to cash crop rice 
to reach the poverty line. 
Enough Land to Go beyond the Poverty Line?
Keeping up with current needs and simply adjusting for 
demographic increase, a typical Tsimane’ household in the 
Table 5. Regression with Old-growth Forest Deforestation, First with Raw Deforestation Data (Columns 1 
& 2), and with the Logarithm of Old-growth Forest and Rice Area (Columns 3 & 4). Data Are the 
Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in Brackets. Significance at the 99, 95 and 90% 
Level Indicated with ***, **, and *.  
 
Old-growth forest  Tobit regression Log of old-growth forest  
 
 
Rice area 0.175** 0.178** - - 
 (0.076) (0.077) 
Log (rice area) - - 0.256*** 0.278*** 
   (0.076) (0.074) 
Walking time NA 0.0026 NA -0.0096 
  (0.0016)  (0.0059) 
Road access NA -0.0056 NA -0.0025 
  (0.0334)  (0.0986)  
Cash income 0.225 0.654*** 0.295 0.053 
 (0.272) (0.253) (0.507) (0.517) 
Market dependence 0.071 0.057 0.397 0.564** 
 (0.063) (0.055) (0.336) (0.235) 
Observations 463 463 259 259 
R
2
 0.29 0.05 0.32 0.15 
Dummy variables Yes No Yes No 
 
NA, non applicable. Variables taken out of regressions using village dummies.  
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subsistence scenario would need to clear 2.4 ha of forest with-
in 10 years and about 3.8 ha within 20 years. This represents 
a 60 percent and 160 percent increase in the current level of 
deforestation (Fig. 2a). Under the Poverty Line + Traditional 
Practice scenario, a typical Tsimane’ household would need 
to clear 4.9 ha within 10 years, or over three times more than 
they currently cut. Within 20 years, Tsimane’ households 
would need to clear 7.9 ha of forest, over five times more 
than they currently cut (Figure 2a). Forest clearance under 
the Poverty Line + Farm Technology scenario resembles the 
Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario. 
The simulation suggests that simply adjusting to de-
mographic increase with current needs would require large 
increases in the amount of forest area cleared for rice. For 
that reason, we explore a scenario where an increase in the 
price of rice would raise the gross income per hectare. Under 
the Poverty Line + Rice Price Increase scenario, forest clear-
ance would be 3.1 ha in year 0, about twice as high as the 
current level of forest cleared by households. It would then 
decrease to 2.8 ha within 10 years, about equal to the cur-
rent subsistence scenario, and then decrease to 2.5 ha within 
20 years, lower than clearance in the subsistence scenario, 
but still 66 percent higher than clearance at time 0 in the 
subsistence scenario.
Enough Work to Meet the Poverty Line?
Since reaching the poverty line would require a large 
increase in the area sown with rice, the possibility of Tsimane’ 
households meeting the poverty threshold through rice cultiva-
tion may become primarily a matter of work availability. We 
found that in the subsistence scenario, households would have 
sufficient labor availability for the next 20 years, when they 
would need 387 person-days/household to meet labor require-
ments. In the Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario, a 
typical household would need 316 days to reach the poverty 
line in year 0, i.e. 163 more days than under the subsistence 
scenario. A household would need 503 days within 10 years to 
reach the poverty line (Figure 2b). After 10 years, households 
choosing to reach the poverty line with no technology input 
would not be able to meet the labor requirements. In contrast, 
under the Poverty Line + Farm Technology scenario, the labor 
requirements would be very close to the labor requirements of 
the subsistence scenario. Households would need 169 person-
days of work in year 0, only 16 more days than under the 
subsistence scenario, and 269 persons-days within 10 years, 
only 26 more days than under the subsistence scenario, but 
230 days less than in the Poverty Line + Traditional Practice 
scenario. Even after 20 years, the Poverty Line + Farm Technol-
ogy scenario would remain largely below the 510 person-day 
ceiling of yearly available labor per household.
Although the use of simple farm technologies may help 
households meet the labor requirements of reaching $1/
person/day, the work demand would increase over time and 
would end up imposing a binding constraint on households. 
In the Poverty Line + Rice Price Increase scenario, the labor 
requirement would decrease over time because the amount of 
forest clearance needed to reach the poverty line would also 
decrease (Figure 2a). Under that scenario, in years 0, 10, and 
Figure 2. Consequences of Reaching the Poverty 
Line with a 4.76% Demography Increase 
on: Forest Clearance Per Household (Fig. 
2a), Work Required to Cultivate (Fig. 2b), 
Fallow Duration in Situations of Varying 
Land Availability (Fig. 2c).
 393VOL. 67, NO. 4, WINTER 2008
20 a household would need 316, 287, and 254 days-person 
of labor each year to reach the poverty line.
Fallow Duration to Reach the Poverty Line
If poor households want to reach the poverty line by sell-
ing rice, the fallow duration will be linked to the number of 
households in the village. We assume a typical village size of 
35 households and a fallow period of at least 11 years to al-
low secondary forest re-growth and to avoid land degradation 
(Metzger 2002). We compare the fallow duration under dif-
ferent scenarios to this benchmark using the same simulations 
as in the previous sections. Then, we add a simulation for the 
Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario in a small village 
of 15 households. We also consider the case of encroachment 
by colonists, equivalent to a 3 percent/year increase in the 
number of households in the village (Appendix B). 
With current land availability and a household clearance 
of 1.5 ha/year, the fallow duration is about 24 years in a village 
of 35 households. Under the subsistence scenario, the fallow 
duration would decrease to about 9.5 years within 20 years in a 
village of 35 households. Under the Poverty Line + Traditional 
Practice scenario, the fallow duration would decrease to 11.6 
years in year 0, about a two-fold reduction compared with the 
subsistence scenario, and to 7.3 years within 10 years, below the 
minimum fallow period of 11 years. Under the Poverty Line + 
Farm Technology scenario, the fallow duration would decrease 
to 10.4 years in year 0 and to 6.5 years within 10 years, below 
the 11 years fallow period, and about the same as the Poverty 
Line + Traditional Practice scenario. In contrast, under the 
Poverty Line + Traditional Practice scenario in a small village 
of 15 households, the fallow duration would be 27.0 years in 
year 0; it would then decrease to 17.0 years within 10 years, 
and to 10.6 years within 20 years.
Under the Poverty Line + Rice Price Increase, the 
fallow duration in a village of 35 households would be 
about 11.6 years in year 0, it would increase to 12.7 years 
within 10 years, and to 14.3 years within 20 years. Under 
the Poverty Line + Encroachment scenario, the fallow 
duration would dramatically decrease over time and would 
reach only 5.4 years within 10 years and about 2.5 years 
within 20 years.
Discussion and Conclusions
Cash cropping rice in a given year was positively associ-
ated with the total area cleared by a household the following 
cropping season. Every additional hectare cultivated with 
rice in year n was associated with 0.26-0.30 more hectares 
deforested in year n+1 and with 0.17-0.28 more hectares of 
old-growth forest cleared in year n+1. Though the increase is 
modest, the statistically significant and positive association 
between cash cropping and clearing of old-growth forest, 
which is available chiefly in distant villages, suggests that 
cash cropping rice is expanding to remote areas. The high 
demand for rice in the local market, and the importance of 
rice in the household economy, suggests that rice cultiva-
tion is likely to fuel more deforestation in coming years. 
We found no statistically significant association between 
deforestation and permanent road access to the villages. 
We found a weak statistical association between deforesta-
tion and walking time to the nearest market, which could 
be explained because despite permanent road access by 
vehicle, many villages cannot rely on a regular transporta-
tion service on these roads. 
Our simulations suggest that if people try to escape pov-
erty by intensifying cash cropping of rice, the labor demands 
on the household will grow. Reaching the poverty line of $1/
person/day by cash cropping rice would require doubling the 
area of forest cleared per household. If one adds demographic 
increase, the level of deforestation would triple in a decade. 
Two possible options to alleviate Tsimane’ pressure on the 
land would be an increase in the price of rice, or the substitu-
tion of rice with another, more profitable cash crop.
Reaching the poverty line would also stimulate important 
changes in households’ time allocation because expand-
ing rice crops would require additional work. We estimate 
that within 10 years, households facing population growth 
without access to new farm technologies would find it hard 
to meet the work requirements needed to reach the poverty 
line. Technological improvements that save labor could ease 
labor constraints, but only temporarily. Even under such a 
scenario, the demographic increase would soon overshadow 
the benefits of technological improvements. 
Reaching the poverty line by cash cropping rice would 
also reduce the duration of the fallow period, in agreement 
with previous work (Coomes, Grimard, and Burt 2000). 
Reduction of the fallow period will be more acute in large 
villages facing land scarcity and more so if encroachment by 
outsiders occurs. Land constraints would eventually also af-
fect households in small villages. Land-saving technological 
improvements might ease these constraints. 
Although rice cash cropping is currently having only mod-
est impacts on the amount of forest area cleared, the socioeco-
nomic context in which poor rural households live—the desire 
to increase income, the high demand for farm products, and 
the demographic increase—suggests that cash cropping rice, and 
associated deforestation, may increase. In light of the low returns 
to labor input, and the high demand for land to cultivate rice, the 
reconciliation of forest conservation and economic development 
requires new alternatives. We conclude with three recommen-
dations to help reconciliate forest conservation and economic 
development related to cash cropping by small holders. 
First, a rise in the price of rice would increase profit-
ability per hectare of land and decrease the amount of forest 
required to reach the poverty line. An increase in the price of 
rice would also have direct effects on labor requirements and 
fallow duration. It would benefit the economy of smallholders, 
but would lower the real income of poor urban households 
that buy rice. An alternative option is to find a more profitable 
cash crop to substitute for rice. Research is needed to explore 
potential high profitability market crops.
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Second, the large labor demand required by rice cultiva-
tion would boost the use of locally available farm technologies 
to reduce labor, namely chainsaws and herbicides. The use of 
chemicals in farming has risks for users and for the environment, 
but could reduce labor requirements. Extension work is needed to 
help farmers use those technologies in appropriate ways. 
Third, herbicides and chain saws are labor-saving technolo-
gies but they do not increase the productivity of rice. Agricultural 
research and extension in the area are needed to increase rice 
productivity. A promising area of research is to find a sustainable 
way to intensify production of cash crops on the same land. As 
nitrogen is the most limiting edaphic factor for crop production 
(Sinclair and Vadez 2002), the use of nitrogen-fixing legumes 
might provide a sustainable way of increasing agricultural produc-
tion. Work is needed to find and introduce such legumes, as they 
need to be marketable and adopted by the population.
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Appendix A. Basic Calculations and
Assumptions of Simulations
Area cleared under the different scenarios. The additional forest 
clearance needed in year 0 to reach the $1/person/day ($365/person/
year) poverty threshold was
[2] FC0 = CCR + [(PL-I)*HHC/(RGM*CRPL)]/PRO. 
Where FC0 is the forest cleared in year 0; CCR is the current clear-
ing amount, 1.5ha/hh/year (Vadez et al. 2004); PL is the poverty line 
($365/person/year); I is the average Tsimane’ income per person (cash 
+ consumption), estimated to $332/person/year (Godoy et al. 2002); 
HHC is the household composition, 6.5 persons/household (this study); 
PRO is the share of newly opened fields planted with rice, 76 percent 
(this study); RGM is the rice gross income, $176/ha with no modern 
technology input (this study); CRPL is the contribution of rice to meet 
poverty line, assumed to be 100 percent.
Then, FC
n
 the additional forest clearance needed in year n was 
such as:
FC 
n
 = FC0*(1 + DI/100)
n 
[3] FC 
n
 = [1.5 + [(33)*6.5/RGM]/0.76]* (1 + 4.76/100) n  
  
Where DI is the demographic increase, estimated to 4.76 percent 
(Reyes-García 2001).
Work needed under different scenarios. From expression [3], we 
calculated the work required to reach poverty line in year n, such as:
Work = RLR*FC
n
 
[4] Work = RLR*[1.5 + [(33)*6.5/RGM]/0.76]*(1 + 4.76/100) n  
  
Where: RLR, the rice labor requirement varies from 102 days-person/
ha (Poverty Line + Traditional farming) to 49.1 days-person/ha (Poverty 
Line + Farm technology).
Fallow duration under the different scenarios. From expression 
[3], we calculated the fallow duration to reach poverty line in year n, 
such as:
Fallow duration = LA/(VS*FC
n
)
[5] Fallow duration = LA/(VS*[1.5 + [(33)*6.5/RGM]/0.76]*(1 + 
DI/100) n  
Where LA, the land availability per village and is estimated to 
1250ha, and VS, the village size varies between 15 households (small 
villages) and 35 households (large villages).
Appendix B. Summary of the Main Assumptions Made in the Different Scenarios Concerning the Area to 
Be Cleared Per Household, the Fallow Duration, and the Labor Requirement, to Meet Poverty 
Line with a 4.76 Percent Demographic Increase. Main Varying Parameter is Indicated in Bold. 
 
Scenarios Main assumptions 
 
 
 Area to be cleared and Work Fallow 
Subsistence Fn = 1.5*(1+DI/100)
n
 with DI = 4.76%/y VS = 35 hh 
PL + Tradional Practice RGM = 176 US$/ha; DI = 4.76%/y VS = 35 hh 
PL + Farm technology RGM = 144 US$/ha; DI = 4.76%/y VS = 35 hh 
PL + Rice price increase RGM = $176/ha; DI = 4.76%/y; VS = 35 hh 
 Price increase = 3%/y 
PL + Tradional Practice - RGM = $176/ha; DI = 
  4.76%/y; VS = 15 hh 
PL + Encroachment - VS increase = 3%/year 
  due to encroachment: 
  VSn = 15*(1+3/100)
n
 
 
